It's a commonplace observation that risk-averse farmers ought to prefer less risk. In this paper, we provide three qualifications to this commonplace. First, we note that (properly defined) "less risk" need not imply "smaller variance." Second, we note that when farmers produce under contract, there may be an important tension between risk and incentives, and we provide a simple characterization of the optimal risk in any production system. Third, we note that while at the margin the behavior of risk-averse farmers may appear to be nearly risk-neutral, it does not follow that one can generally treat such producers "as if" they were risk-neutral without being greatly led astray.
Introduction
Agricultural economists have long recognized that risk plays a paramount role in the production choices made by small farmers (Sandmo, 1971 ).
An important consequence of this early recognition was the development of the "farm-household" model (Roumasset et al., 1979) . In its essence, this model treats each farm-household as a sort of "Robinson Crusoe," interacting with the larger economy only through spot markets and (as a consequence) bearing all the risk associated with agricultural production.
Taking as our criterion of success the ability of a model to predict observed outcomes, this basic model has had some very important successes in advancing our understanding for topics as diverse as the aggregate supply response of agricultural households (Pope and Just, 1991) , and the diffusion of new technologies (Besley and Case, 1993) .
Of course, predictive power may not be the only characteristic we desire of our models. If the assumptions made by those models seem to be drastically at odds with reality, then this raises important questions about whether such an unrealistic model actually advances our understanding of the phenomenon we're concerned with. In the case of the basic farm-household model, the basic assumption that each farmer operates as an entirely autonomous agent linked to the larger economy only by spot markets may have been a reasonably accurate description of historical farms in the US. However, at least for producers of some kinds of commodities, increasing vertical integration means that farmers in the US obtain their inputs and market their outputs not on spot markets at all, but under contract with some intermediary.
The growing importance of contracts in farming has important implications for farm-household behavior, and requires a more flexible modelling strategy. Under contract, the same risk that reduces farmer welfare and distorts production decisions can be controlled by the intermediary to shape farmers' incentives.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we give a careful definition of "risk" as it affects the welfare of farm-households, and show that variance is not the same thing at all.
2 In Section 3, we explore the tension between risk and contractual incentives, and provide a simple characterization of the risk associated with the optimal contract for any production system. We also provide a link between the inefficiency of a contract and the variance of production, further illustrating the inadequacy of measures of variance for understanding the risk farmers face. Section 5 concludes.
Variance and Risk
Consider a farmer who operates a risky production function yielding profits x. We assume that the farmer has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U : R → R, with U strictly increasing, weakly concave, and twice continuously differentiable. Ex ante, the farmer's anticipated utility from owning the risky production function is just the expected utility the farmer derives from 2 Though the examples we will give are novel, the general idea is certainly not: Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) usually get credit for introducing the idea among economists, but Borch (1969) makes the same point very forcefully, and the general point was appreciated much earlier by at least some noneconomists (Hardy et al., 1934) .
consuming profits, EU (x). Now, since U is concave, Jensen's inequality implies that the farmer would (weakly) prefer to operate an alternative production function yielding profits equal to the expected value of x with certainty. It's natural to ask, then, what certain profit the farmer would be willing to forego in order to eliminate the risk associated with production. The answer is given by the risk premium π which solves the equation (Pratt, 1964) . Note that the risk premium generally depends on both the distribution of x as well as on the the properties of the utility function, and is denominated in the same units as are profits. A natural counterpart to the risk premium is a quantity denominated in utils, which we'll call the risk ρ faced by the farmer, 3 given by
Note that risk is related to the risk premium by ρ = U (Ex) − U (Ex − π). Note that, as for the risk premium, risk is defined in such a way as to depend not only on the variation in x, but also on the preferences of the farmer. Random variation which doesn't affect payoffs (say in the color of the currency the farmer receives) is not regarded as risk.
Let us consider some simple examples. Suppose that U (x) = log(x), with x distributed log-normal, with µ denoting the mean of log(x), and σ 2 the variance. Now, observe that the variance of x is given by e 2(µ+σ 2 ) − e 2µ+σ 2 , while the risk is given by
Now consider an increase in the parameter µ. This increases the variance of x, of course, but produces no change in the risk at all.
Of course, in this example an increase in µ increases not just the variance of x, but also its mean. Accordingly, an objection one might raise is that somehow the increase in variance associated with an increase in µ is simply compensated by an increase in the mean. A better illustration of the point that variance is generally a poor measure of risk would contrast two different random variables, x 1 and x 2 , with the following properties:
(1) Ex 1 = Ex 2 ; (2) var(x 1 ) > var(x 2 ); and (3) EU (x 1 ) > EU (x 2 ).
In words, we wish to consider two different production arrangements in which expected profits are equal, and in which the farmer prefers the arrangement with the higher variance. It turns out to be simple to construct simple, plausible examples which satisfy these properties. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) provide an example in which profits are a continuous random variable. Here we offer an even simpler example in which x is discrete. As before, let the farmer have logarithmic preferences, and suppose that each of x 1 and x 2 take one of four possible values (listed in the first column of Table 1 ). The probabilities associated with these values differ, however; the probabilities for x 1 are found in the column labelled p 1 , while the corresponding probabilities for x 2 are found in the column labelled p 2 . The probabilities are chosen so that expected profits are equal for the two distributions, at 0.698, and so that the variance of x 1 is greater than the variance of x 2 (0.4660 and 0.3141, respectively). Nonetheless, a farmer choosing between the two profit distributions will prefer the first (in which his expected utility is -0.6) to the second (in which his expected utility is -0.613). The reason is simple: the probability of the very worst outcome (x = −1) is greater for the second profit distribution, and a farmer with logarithmic preferences (or any preferences exhibiting decreasing absolute risk aversion; c.f. Pratt (1964) ) will particularly want to avoid very bad outcomes. Using our earlier definition, the risk of x 1 is approximately 0.4439, while the risk of x 2 is 0.5739. Faced with two distributions with the same expected profit, the farmer will always prefer the one with the lower risk. Table 1 Two possible distributions of profit. The first column lists possible value of profit while the second column gives the ex post utility associated with the corresponding realization of profit. The probability of the random variable x i taking any of the values in the first column is given by the corresponding row in the column headed by p i .
In much applied work, the variance of production outcomes is used as a proxy for the risk associated with operating the production function (e.g. Allen and Lueck (1992) ). From the discussion above, although using the variance of production may appear to be a preference-free way of measuring risk, in fact regarding variance as risk places strong restrictions on farmer preferences. To see what these are, let us proceed by supposing that risk is in fact proportional to the variance of x. Then for some positive constant c,
for some b ∈ R. Note that this exercise imposes very little structure on the distribution of x; but imposes a great deal on the utility function U . In words, assuming that the variance of x is a measure of the risk a farmer faces is equivalent to assuming that the farmer has a quadratic utility function.
For some applications, the analyst may be perfectly comfortable with assuming that farmers have quadratic utility; certainly choosing this functional form permits a variety of simplifications, particularly when the constraints faced by the farmer take a linear form, such as a linear budget constraint. 4 However, if the analyst is at all concerned with the role that risk may play in determining farmer behavior, casting the farmer's problem into the linear-quadratic framework will generally be a very poor choice-one important property of these problems is that the actions chosen by farmers will be invariant to the variance (risk) that they face (this is just the property of certainty equivalence). Thus, in many applications, assuming that variance measures risk is equivalent to assuming that risk doesn't matter at all in shaping behavior.
Risk Under Contract
We consider a model in which a risk neutral intermediary 5 contracts with a risk averse farmer to produce a commodity which may vary in quantity q. The farmer can influence the distribution of output at a cost a, (think of a as either effort or as an ex ante investment in inputs). The distribution of q is some F (q|a), with the support of q assumed to be independent of a. We assume that the density f (q|a) exists, and is a continuously differentiable function of a. Having produced output q, the farmer could choose to sell the commodity on the wholesale market, taking the price of the commodity p as given.
4 When the farmer's objective function is quadratic in his choice variables while constraints are linear, then the farmer solves an optimal linear regulator problem. 5 If one supposes that intermediaries are competitive firms, then it's natural to suppose that these firms maximize expected profits; i.e., are risk neutral. However, there's no difficulty in regarding both intermediaries and farmers as risk-averse. If the intermediary is risk averse (even if much more risk-averse than the farmer), an efficient contract will share risk between both parties.
Should he choose to handle his own marketing, the problem facing the farmer is to choose a so as to maximize expected utility, or
The solution to this problem involves choosing a so as to satisfy
The interpretation of this first order condition is standard; the left-hand side reflects the expected marginal costs of investing a, while the right-hand side reflects the expected marginal benefits. In this case, the benefits have to do with changing the distribution of output q; these are measured by the likelihood ratio f a (q|a)/f (q|a).
Because the farmer faces all the risk, one might suppose there to be scope for some intermediary to assume the risk (or to share, if the intermediary is also risk-averse). This intermediary could assume a number of guises; it might be a firm, a grain elevator, a farmers' cooperative, or a futures market. In any event, we imagine that the intermediary writes some contract with the farmer prior to planting. In the simplest version of the model, the farmer and intermediary agree on some level of investment, and on some form of payment for the farmer. To avoid imposing any artificial structure on this compensation, we imagine that the intermediary is free to specify a different payment to the farmer for every possible realization of q; we denote this contingent payment by w(q). Thus, in designing the contract, the intermediary solves the problem
but, because the intermediary must induce the farmer to actually sign the contract, the expected utility of the farmer if he signs the contract must be greater than or equal to the farmer's expected utility if he doesn't sign the contract. We suppose this reservation utility to be some number U , and express this constraint by
Working with the first order conditions from this problem, we see that for all q,
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (3). The striking thing about this equation is that, because λ is some constant, the intermediary chooses to specify a contract in which the farmer's compensation doesn't actually depend on the output q; in effect the intermediary maximizes expected profits by insuring the farmer against all risk. Turning to the question of what level of investment is chosen, we see that
here the left-hand side measures the marginal benefit of an increase in investment a, while the right-hand side measures the marginal costs associated with compensating the farmer for the increase. The difference between this equation determining a and the determination of investment in the absence of an intermediary lies entirely in the fact that the farmer's compensation is now certain. However, whether the absence of uncertainty causes the farmer to make larger or smaller investments depends both on preferences U , and also on the dependence of quantity on investment given by f (q|a).
Although the model we've presented is extremely simple and stylized, the observation that the risk-neutral intermediary will bear all risk is remarkably robust. If we think about obvious directions in which one might wish to extend this model, we see that this feature survives the addition of additional sources of risk in production, whether in quality or quantity; survives more elaborate, non-separable utility functions; and survives the addition of dynamic elements.
Under many real-world contracts, of course, it seems to be the case that farmers are not perfectly insured against risk, even when intermediation is apparently competitive. It may make sense to introduce some sort of friction to keep the intermediary from insuring the farmer against all marketing risk. A promising sort of friction is private information regarding investment; if the farmer chooses a, but these investments can't be observed by the intermediary, then it's easy to see that the intermediary won't be willing to bear all price risk. We capture this in our model by having the intermediary recommend some level of investment, and require that this choice be incentive compatible; that is, it must be in the farmer's best interests to actually make the recommended investments, or
Now, if the intermediary offers the farmer a constant compensation w, the farmer will respond by choosing the lowest possible quality of produce; this is clearly inefficient in general. However, if the intermediary is able to only observe output, the efficient contract will typically expose the farmer to some risk associated with the variation in output. In particular, so long as the production problem is suitably concave and the farmer is sufficiently riskaverse (Jewitt, 1988) , any interior solution to the contracting problem will
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the participation constraint (3), and µ is the multiplier associated with the incentive compatibility constraint (4). The ratio −U (w(q) − a)/U (w(q) − a) is Pratt's measure of absolute risk aversion. Note that when the incentive compatibility constraint isn't binding, then we recover the constant compensation for farmers seen above; when (4) is binding, then compensation depends on output via the likelihood ratio
.
While the observation that farmers' compensation depends on output implies that farmers will face some risk under an optimal contract, we'd like to say something more precise. However, to do so we need to place some additional structure on both preferences and technology. Consider the following two assumptions:
Assumption 2 (a) r −∞ F (q|a)dq is a non-increasing, convex function of r; (b) qf (q|a)dq is a non-decreasing, concave function of a; and (c) f a (q|a)/f (q|a) is a non-decreasing concave function of q for any a.
Assumption 1 amounts to assuming that farmers' relative risk aversion is equal to the constant α, while Assumption 2 are ways of imposing a sort of stochastic diminishing returns. With these in hand, we can give a lower bound on the variance of compensation:
Proposition 1 If preferences and technology satisfy Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, then
where I a = E(f a (q|a)/f (q|a)) 2 is Fisher's information matrix.
PROOF. Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 allow us to appeal to Proposition 1 of Jewitt (1988) to assert that the first order approach is valid. In particular, the constraint (4) can be rewritten as
Now, using Assumption 1, this implies that
Now, since f a (q|a)dq = 0, it follows that for any constant k
thus, applying the Schwartz inequality yields
Accordingly, choosing k = Ew gives us
Suppose that one had data on output q, and from these data wished to infer investments a. The variance of an efficient estimate of a will be precisely the reciprocal of Fisher's information I a . Thus, Proposition 1 relates two variances: if the precision with which one can infer investments a is poor, then the corresponding variance in compensation will be great; higher powered incentives will be necessary to induce the farmer to undertake reasonably large levels of investment.
In Section 2 we established that knowing the variance of output wasn't adequate for measuring the risk faced by a farmer who transacted on spot markets. An analogous conclusion holds for a farmer who produces under contract-the variance of compensation doesn't adequately characterize the loss of utility associated with risk. Next, we show that by placing slightly different restrictions on utilities, that we can use an argument similar to the argument of Proposition 1 to give a lower bound on the risk of an optimal contract. First, since our measure of risk is denominated in utils rather than in units of the consumption good, it's natural to measure investment in utils as well. Accordingly, we assume that the utility of the farmer is given by U (w) − a, where the function U is as defined above, but with the additional restriction that
The first assumption is self-explanatory; the second puts a lower bound on the farmer's relative risk aversion. Assumption 3 and Assumption 2 together guarantee the validity of the first-order approach. Thus, we can restate the problem facing the intermediary firm as
such that
and
The first order conditions for this problem imply a compensation rule satisfying
for some positive numbers λ and µ. As before, these constants can be interpreted as the Lagrange multipliers associated with (7) and (8), respectivelythus, larger values of λ are associated with higher levels of reservation utility U , while larger values of µ are associated with more severe inefficiencies stemming from the intermediary's inability to observe a. It follows that
and (using the inverse function theorem) that Ew(q) = λ. As a consequence, the farmer's risk associated with the contract is given by
Of course, knowing the risk involved in the contract requires one to solve for λ and µ. However, as above, we can give a lower bound on the risk without knowing these quantities:
Proposition 2 If the farmer's technology satisfies Assumption 2 while preferences satisfy Assumption 3, then
PROOF. From (8) and the observation that f a (q|a)dq = 0, it follows that
Applying Schwartz's inequality, we have
Now, EU (w) = a + U , and Assumption 3 guarantees that U 2 is concave. Accordingly, it follows from Jensen's inequality that
Note that the lower bound on risk is increasing in investment a and reservation utility U , and decreasing in Fisher's information I a . From the proof above, an interesting special case has U (x) = √ c. In this case, the inequality of Proposition 2 holds with equality, so that
Now, what can we conclude about risk from this? Effort/investment a is determined endogenously (recall that the recommended a is a choice variable in the intermediary's problem). Fisher's information is a function only of a. Accordingly, in the present case both investment and risk depend only on the remaining free parameter, the farmer's reservation utility U . Since utilities are difficult to measure, one might wonder how to operationalize this measure of risk in a real agricultural system. We provide one possible approach in the next section.
Example
The lower bounds provided by Propositions 1 and 2 depend critically on Fisher's information, which in turn depends on the distribution function F (q|a). How is one to obtain empirically useful estimates of I a ? In this section we consider a simple example, due to Just and Pope (1978) , who discuss an interesting class of stochastic production functions.
The starting point for Just and Pope is the observation that in real world agricultural production, inputs often affect the shape of the entire distribu-tion of output, and don't simply change the mean (or the log of the mean). Accordingly, they suggest a production function of the form
where is distributed standard normal. We interpret β to be a technological parameter, Z to be a vector of observable inputs to production, and a to be the utility cost to the farmer of providing unobservable inputs. To be concrete, in a simple application Just and Pope (1979) suppose that the input Z is nitrogen fertilizer, and estimate production functions for corn and oats from experimental data. In this application, it's possible to interpret a as the care used in applying fertilizer. Now, let the utility of the farmer be given by √ w − a, and assume with Just and Pope that g(Z, a) = e a log Z and h(Z, β) = e β log Z . Equation (18) of Just and Pope (1978) gives the formula for Fisher's information,
2 e 2(a−β) log Z ; a choice of units allows us to normalize log Z = 1. Accordingly, if a risk-neutral intermediary were to write an efficient contract with a farmer operating the Just-Pope technology, the risk faced by the farmer would be given by ρ = (a + U ) 2 + 2e 2(β−a) − (a + U ).
Conclusion
A risk-averse farmer who markets his output on spot-markets cares about the risk involved in production, not the variance-variance will adequately summarize risk only in the case where farmers have quadratic utility functions, and a number of studies have found quadratic utility to be implausible, on both theoretical (Arrow, 1965) and empirical (Binswanger, 1981; Pope and Just, 1991) grounds.
For many production systems, the utility loss associated with risk will be much greater than the variance of production would suggest. Perhaps partly for this reason, US farmers increasingly tend to produce under contract. However, any intermediary which designs a production or marketing contract needs to carefully balance the reduction in risk the farmer achieves under the contract against the moral hazard introduced if the intermediary offers too much insurance. Here we offer two simple results which give a lower bound to the risk an efficient contract ought to offer. One of these, applicable when farmers' investments are unobserved, gives a lower bound on the variance of contractual payments received by the farmer. The second, applicable when the farmer takes unobserved costly actions (think of labor effort), gives a lower bound on the utility risk found in an efficient contract.
Either of these lower bounds depend critically on the production technology being operated by the farmer, and depend in particular on Fisher's information, which one can think of as being related to the precision with which the intermediary can infer the farmer's actions given observed inputs and outputs. A simple example, using a production function due to Just and Pope (1978) , illustrates one way of calculating the optimal risk for a contract for corn or oats, where care in fertilizer application is unobserved.
